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IN RE HALCOMB

[21 C.2d

The judgment is modified by deducting the sum of $500
:from: the ~ward' to each plaintiff' as against the defendant
J. A~ 'Tassi only, and as so modified is affirmed, respondents
to recover costs on appeal.
Gibson, C.' J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Carter, J., and Traynor,
J.;concurred. .
.

[Crim. No. 4423. In Bank. Oct. 30, 1942.]

In reGRADYHALCOMB, on Habeas.Corpus.
[la, lb] Escape-.-By Misdemeanants.-PeiJ.. Code, § @32,. appliA~
to escapes" by persons' convicted of· misdemeanors as wei1 ail
felony pi'isoners•. (In r.e Bamire" 49 Cal.App.2d 709, 122l'.2n
361, . disapproved.)

[21 Statuie&;:presumptions-:-Legislative Knowledge.-When. the
Legislature' enacts' a code. section in practically the exact .lan~ge .(i'f.~, pripr. section; it is presumed to have.knowledgA
. of ih:edecisions construing the prior section.
IS];'Id;':"'Construction-,-Section Headings.-Unofficial headings to
code sections are' .not .binding 'upon the courts.

PROCE~DING in hab~as corpus to secure release from
custody.. Writ ·denied.
SeibertL. ~efton for Petitioner.
EarlWarren,.Attorney General, and David K. Lener, Dep.uty AttorrieyGeneral, for Respondent.
CUR'rIS, J .-Petitioner,now in custody of the warden of
.,the dallfornia State ·Prison at San. Quentin,seeks by habeas
'corPus', proceeding.htsrelease from said imprisonment. His
:petition .shows that he was convicted of a misdemeanor and
sentenced to one year's imprisonment in the coun.ty jail at
Sari Bernardino.. At' his own request he was assigned to work
upon/the county priSon road gang of said county for the term
[2] . See 23 Cal.Jur 782.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Escape, § 5; [2] Statutes, § 185;
[3] Statutes, §175.
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of his imprisonment, and while a prisoner in said road gang,
and on the 22d day of January, 1~42,heescape4 therefrom.
Upon his apprehension by the officials of sald county 11e was
charged with the "crime of escape........afelohy;" ~e pleaded
guilty to said charge and was sentenced to imprisonment in
the California State Prison at San Quentin for the term pre,
scribed. by law.
.
The information charging petitioner with the crime of
escape does not specift any particular' section of· the code,
the violation of which w()uld constitute tllecrimf,lof escape,
It simply alleged that he escl;tped froin the custody of ~hc
sheriff of said county contrary to~heform, . force andefl'ect
of the statute in such casemadeang,provided, and against
the peace' and dignity of the People ofCalifoniia.
Prior to 1941, section 101 of the Pimal Gode was the only
section of· that code that m,ade it a crime fo:r.a prl&oner to
escape fi-om legal custody, but in that . year the. LeB'i$1ature,
split section 107. into two parts ind. gave one of said' parts
the old number107,and the other part the new. number of
4532. These .two sections were in: effect at, t1;ledll-te Qf. the
alleged. crime of escape to which thepetltioner pleadeQ. guilty.
The' present section t07 of the' Pena:! Coderellites orilyto escapes or attempted escapes'" from anytrainmg school or reformat()ry "or county hospitaL" It is· perfectly cleat: that
petitioner was not guilty of the viohi,tio'n.·of this section of
the code.
Section 4532 of the Penal Code as enacted in 1941, reads
'
..
as follows:
"Every prisoner charged with or convicted of a felonY who
is eon:ftnedin any jailor prison or industrial farm or'industrial road camp or who is engaged onltny county road or
other coUnty work or .who is in the lawfUL custody of any
officer or person, who. e~capes or attempts to escape .from
such jail, prison, industrial farm or industrialroadeampor
from the custody of the officer or person .iIi charge ot him
while engaged on or going to or returning from such. county
work oi-from the custody of any officer or person 'in whose
lawful custody he is, is guilty' of a felony and is punishable
by imprisonment in the State prison not exceeding 10 years,
or by a fine not exceeding ten thous(:tnd dollars ($10,000), or
by both such fin.e and imprisonment."
[ia] It is the position of the petitioner that section 4532 applies only to escapes of "persons charged with or convicted of
a felony," and as at the time of his escape petitioner was under
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conviction of a misdemeano~ only, he violated no provision
of this section Qf the codE) in eluding the custody of the officer
who at'the time had him in charge.
Insofar as the question now before us is concerned section
4532 of the PenaL Code,as in effect at the time petitioner
made his escape, does not differ materially except as to the
'punishment from section 107 of the Penal Code, enacted in
1923 and construed by this court in the year 1925 in the caSe
'of In re Haines, 195 Cal. 605 [234 P. 883]. Section 4532 of
the Penal Code applies to escapes of every character mentioned in section 107 of the Penal. Code in effect in 1925 and
construed in 11l. re Haines, supra, except escapes from a "publictraining school, reformatory or county hospitl],l." These
jUstmentioMd, as slated above; are covered by the new sec,tion 107 of the PeIl-al Code enacted in 1941. The only additionalpro"isions contained in section 4532 not found in $ect~on 107 as amended in 1923 include "industrial farm or industrial road work" and the present section provides that
an escape from either of those places is a crime. It will
,tlJ.erefore be se~n that insofar as material to this proceeding,
se.etion,4532 of thE) Penal Code is precisely like section 107
of the Penal Code as construed by this court in In re Haines,
supra.
In the case of In re Haines, supra, the petitioner was convicted of the crime of malicious mischief, a misdemeanor, and
while serving a sentence in the county jail of Shasta County
as punishment for said crime,he escaped from the legal custody of the officer who then had charge of him. He was apprehended and charged with the crime of escape. By virtue
of this charge he was imprisoned and restrained of his liberty
by the sheriff of said county. He instituted habeas corpus
proceedings and in support thereof contended "that the
charge under which he is held and thereby deprived of his
liberty does not constitute a public offense 'inasmuch as, at
the time of said' alleged escape said George Haines was not. a
prisoner charged with or convicted of a felony, but was a
prisoner convicted of a misdemeanor' ; that section 107 of the
genal Code,' applies only to prisoners charged with or convicted of a£elony.'" This is precisely the position of the
.pet~tioner in tlJ.js proceeding. This court held in that case
that the contention of petitioner was without merit and reJna.nded the. petitioner.
·,','tfis not necessary for us in this proceeding to discuss
~~~, gro)lll~s upo:!). which the court decided the question 111-

.,
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volved in that case. It is sufficient we think to call attention
to the fact that this decision was rendered over seventeen
years ago, and it has never been overruled. It is evident that
the opinion was prepared with unusual care and after a
most thorough and minute consideration of the various provisions of the section and of their relation to the intent and
purpose of the Legislature in the enactment of the section.
It was the unanimous decision of the court as then constituted. The section of the code as therein construed has never
been repealed nor amended in any material respect except
as stated above. Moreover the provisions thereof material to
the present proceeding' were re-enacted as section 4532 at the
recent session of the Legislature.
Prior to the decision of In re Haines, supra, by this court,
the District Court of Appeal in an application by the same
petitioner had reached the same conclusion as that at which
this court arrived in construing said section (In re Haines,
68 Cal.App. 522 [229 P. 984] ), and at a later date but prior
to 1941, the District Court of Appeal had the same question
before it in the case of In re Durand, 6 Cal.App.2d 69 [44
P~2d 367]. Inthe latter decision it was ruled: "Irrespective
of whatever force there may be in petitioner's point, the
question raised thereby is no longer an open one so far as
the courts are concerned because it has been held by the
Supreme Court in the case of In re Haines, 195 Cal. 605 [234
P. 883], in conformity with a previous decision rendered by
the District Court of Appeal (In re Haines, 68Cal.App. 522
[229 P. 984]), that the said section 107 appli(,s to misdemeanor prisoners as well as to felony prisoners. "[2] The Legislature is presumed to have known of thcse decisions and to
have had them in mind when it enacted section 4532 of the
Penal Code in practically the exact language of section 107
of the Penal Code as in force at the time of the decisions construing the earlier section. (Estate of Moffitt, IG3 Cal. 359
[95 P. 653, 1025, 20 L.R.A. N.S. 207] ; Whitley v. Superior
Court, 18 Ca1.2d 75, 78 [113P.2d 449] ; Miller v. McColgan,
17 Ca1.2d 432 [110 P.2d 419, 1:14 A.L.R. 1424].)
[lb]' The sole reliance of petitioner in support of his petition
is upon the' case of In re Ramirez decidcd by the District
Court of Appeal and reported in 49 Cal.App.2d709(February 14, 1942), [122 P.2d 361]. The decision in that case is
in direct conflict with the decision of this court in the case of
In re Haines, st~pra, and. for that reason should be and is
21 C.2d-5
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hereby q,isappi',?ved. [3] "\Vhile not relying solely upon tho
"h.eadinS',' prec,~di,ngsection 4532 of thc Penal Code as a
groWj.d f~r its degision, the District Court of Appeal refers to
sa1,d ".heaq,ing"to r,einforce its construction of said section.
'r4e 'head:ilJ.gs to this' section are indicated as encloscd in
b:rac~ets, anq are not to be ,regarded as official. (Deering
:t>en. Code, 1941, p.Xxii.) Evidently thl'Y arc inserted in
tP'ecode by.,the pl!-bli'sher and as such they are not binding
. upon the ¢ourts. 'Even if the heading of this section were
cont~inediIi.its, officiai enactment, it would not govern, limit
orniodify l!.or in a~y manner affect the scope, meaning or
hitentof said seqtion. (Pen. Code, § 100Q4.) This last mentioned section. of the Penal Code was a part of the !'lame statlite enacted. in 1941, which amended section 107 of the Penal
Code, by dividing the then existing section into two parts,
'Qne of :which is the present section 4532 of the Penal Code.
Iror the reason stated herein. the petition is denied and the
,petitioner is remanded to the custody of the warden of the
'State :t>risonat San Quentin.
. Gibson, 0; J.,Shenk, J., Carter, J., and Schauer, J. pro
te:m.,,:'concurred.
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent. Section 4532 of the Penal Code
plaiilly de:fines the class of persons to whom the section applies. as "Every prisoner charged with or convicted of a
felony." (Italics ours.) The qualifying phrase is unequivocal.Whether or not it is wise is a concern of the Legislature and not of courts. The courts cannot lift qualifying
phrases from legislation without usurping legislative functions Ellld the usurpation is particularly flagrant when the
phrase·has been added by amendment. As first enacted in
1872, section 107, the forerunner of section 4532, simply
provided: "Every prisoner confined in any other prison than
the state prison, who escapes or attempts to escape therefrom,
'is 'guilty of a misdemeanor." In 1923 the Legislature
amended the section, making the crime a felony and amplifying the scope of the section by setting forth additional circumstances under which escapes might be made or attempted.
At the same time the word "prisoner" was qualified by the
'phrase "charged with or convicted of a felony." Sections
105 and 106 covered the escape of felons who were imprisoned
or being conveyed 'to or from prison. Section 107 was in~tended to cover escape under other circumstances, including

Oct. 1942]

IN RE HALCOMB

131

[21 C.2d 1261

escape from the lawful custody of any officer, or from a
county jail pending trial after indictment or preliminary examination or after conviction and final judgment preceding
removal to the state prison. As a result there was no longer
any provision for the punishment of misdemeanants who
escaped or attempted to escape. The legislative history of the
f'e
bill amending section 107 set forth in the opinion: in
Haines, 195 Cal. 605, 608, 614-616 [234 P. 883], indicates
that the Legislature deliberately excluded misdemeanants. It
may well be that the Legislature was unwilling to bring misdemeanants within the scope of an amendment converting a
misdemeanor to the more serious crimeaf felony. There is
no way of determining with certahty whether the omission
was deliberate or an oversight. In any event it is no ordinary omission, no mere absence of a phrase. Misdemeanants
are excluded because felons are singled out in a qualifying
phrase that states what it means in the simplest terms. The
court cannot reject its obvious interpretation without denying all assurance that an act of the Legislature will be interpreted to mean what it says. It is for the I.egislature and not
the court, to confirm the omission if it was intended, or to
correct it if it was not. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1858.) It is questionable whether the court should undertake to correct even
an obvious oversight when the Legislature has it within its
power to do so. Whatever delay attends legislative action is
far outweighed by the uncertainty that must attend judicial
correction of legislative lapses; There is always the possibility
that the Legislature intended a provision to be read as it is
written, however unwise it appears. The court's refusal to
read it as it is written makes it impossible for anyone to
rely upon the written word of the Legislature.
For the foregoing reasons In re Haines, supra, and In re
Durand, 6 Cal.App.2d 69 [44 P.2d 367], shOuld be overruled.
Age has not hallowed their error. The qualifying phrase that
they sought to conjure away still stands in plain, unmistakable words to mock the interpretatiOl. that would interpret
away its existence. The failure of the Legislature to change
the language of the statute thereafter, far from being an
adoption of the court's revision, represents merely a failure
to undertake its own revision. The division in 1941 of section 107 of the Penal Code into sections 107 and 4532 was
not a revision, and the problem raised by the qualifying
phrase was carried over into the rearrangement. The amendment of 1933 simply prescribed the punishment previously
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incorporated by reference to section 108 of the Penal Code,
while the 1935 amendment merely included "industrial farm
or road camp" among the places from which it was a felony
to escape or attempt to escape. There is no evidence that the
Legislature ever had its attention directed to the construction in question. It is unrealistic to suppose that it can take
note, much. less deliberate the effect, of each judicial construction of statutory provisions, absorbed as it is with forging legislation for an endless number and variety of problems, under the constant pressure of considerations of urgency
and expediency. ' The fiction that the failure of the Legislature to .repudiate an erroneous construction amounts to an
incorporation of that construction into the statute not only
commits the Legislature to embrace something that it may
not even be aware· of, but bars the court from re-examining
its own errors, consequences as unnecessary as they are serious. It is an. iniquitous fiction indeed that reads into the
Legislature's silence an acceptance of a construction belied
by the phrase whose insistent presence drowns out the inter. pretation that would be its requiem. (See Toucey v. New
York Life Ins. Co~, 314 U.S. 118, 139-140 [62 S.Ct. 139,
86 I1.Ed. 100]; HeZvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106,119-12i
[60 S.Ct. 444, 84L.Ed. 604, 125 A.IJ.R. 1368].)
Edmonds, J .• concurred.
Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied November 27,1942. Edmonds, J., and TraYI).or, J., voted for a rehearing.
.

[Crim. No. 4426. In Bank.

Oct. 30, 1942.J

"In re BERT PETRIE, on Habeas Corpus.

'.:;.

[Orhn. No. 4422.
."

>'.

In Bank.

Oct. 30, 1942.]

'

In .re.pAUL BAFFORD, on Habeas Corpus.
,,~.

'.

til .:Escapa:-~y

M1sdemeanants.-Pen. Code, § 107, as amended
in. )935,. :!app.~ie<l to escapes. of persons convicted of misdemeanors. as. well as felony prisoners.
•

.

j"'

•

rlrS~e ;5 .C~l.Jur. Ten-year Supp. 510.
'·HCK.'nig.:Reference:[l] Escape, § 5.
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PROCEEDINGS in habeas corpus to secure release from
. custody. Writs denied.
Seibert L. Sefton, Harry A. Houser and Owen D. Richard~
son for Petitioners.
Earl Warren, Attorney General, and David K. Lener;.Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
CURTIS, J.-These two proceedings involve practically the
same question of law. Each of the petitioners was originally
convicted of a misdemeanor-Paul Bafford of petit th;eft and
Bert Petrie of the charge of drunkeriness-and while in the
lawful custody of a peace officer under a judgment of conviction of the crime of which he was charged, each escaped
from said officer. After his apprehension, each was convicted
of, or pleaded guilty to, the crime of escape, and by a judgment of the superior court of the county in which the action
was pending, each was sentenced to a term of imprisonment
in one of the state prisons of the state.. Each of the petitioners has applied to this court through separate proceedings in habeas corpus to be released from his said imprisonment, contending that he is illegally imprisoned by the
.
warden of said state prison.
[1] BafIordin the first instance was committed tothe California State Prison at Folsom, but was later transferred to' San
Quentin where he remained up to the date of the filing of this
present petition. Petrie was sentenced direct to San Quentin.
, Each of the petitioners was convicted under the provjsions' of
section 107 of the Penal Code as enacted in 1935, and prior
to its amendment in 1941. This section of the code was originally enacted in 1872, and amended in 1923. It was subsequently ameI).ded in 1933 and.again in 1935; The amendment
of 1933 made no change in the section as it stood in 1923,
except as to the punishment for the offense of escape. It provided as did th~ section as .amended in 1923, that a. prisoner
violating the terms of the section was guilty o~ a felony'- The
section as amended in 1923 fixed the punishlllent "as provided in section 108 of the Penal Code," whilethEi section
as amended in 1933, provided for a definite tem of imprisonmerit in. the state prison or' a fine or botlJ.. The section as
amended in 1935 simply added" industrial 'farm or industrial
road camp" as the places from which .should a prisoner escape,
he would be guilty of the crimeo{escape. Nothingcontained

